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Sentiment has been rising among financial market participants that pension
accounting standards are confusing and lack a solid grounding in economic principles.
Accordingly, at its November 10 meeting, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) voted unanimously to reconsider FASB Statement No. 87, Employers’
Accounting for Pensions, and FASB Statement No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, which generally covers retiree medical and life
insurance plans. The FASB seeks to make accounting for postretirement benefits more
“conceptually sound” and align U.S. standards more closely with international practice.
The FASB’s recommendation was for the project to proceed in two phases. Phase One
would focus on the balance sheet, eliminating all smoothing of actuarial gains and losses
in the funding position that flows into the other comprehensive income section of
shareholder’s equity. FASB sources said they hope to have this revision in place for firms
whose fiscal years end after September 30, 2006, so that the financial statements of most
firms with December 31 fiscal year-ends will reflect the new standards in their 2006
annual reports. The FASB plans to release an exposure draft by March 2006, accept comments
through June and possibly hold a roundtable in July.
Phase Two would completely reevaluate postretirement benefit accounting, including the
expense calculations reflected on the income statement. This phase is expected to take
several years.
To project the impact of Phase One, we examined Watson Wyatt’s database of pension
and other postretirement plans of FORTUNE 1000 companies. We used data for fiscal
year-end 2004, the most current data available.
To gauge the effect of marking the balance sheet to market for pension plans, we looked at
the difference between the funding position — calculated as the projected benefit obligation
(PBO) minus the market value of assets1 — and the net asset or liability recognized on
the balance sheet as reported in the footnotes. However, many sponsors already recognize
an amount on their balance sheet that exceeds the net amount recognized figure reported
in the pension footnote. Sponsors that have an underfunded accumulated benefit obligation
(ABO) must recognize a minimum pension liability. Roughly two-thirds of our sample
fell into this category. For these firms, we estimate the impact of Phase One as the difference
between PBO-based funding status and ABO-based funding status — or simply the
difference between the PBO and the ABO.
For other postretirement benefit plans (such as retiree medical and life insurance), we also
looked at the difference between the funding position — the accumulated postretirement
benefit obligation (APBO) minus the market value of assets (if any, as most of these plans
are unfunded) — and the net amount recognized reported in the footnotes.
The difference between the funding position and the net amount recognized for both pensions
and other postretirement benefit plans is driven primarily by unamortized actuarial
losses. These losses are included in the funding position but are fed into the net amount
recognized from these plans on the balance sheet, generally over 10 to 15 years. As of
2004, the difference between the net amount recognized and the current funding position
is substantial for the firms in our sample, owing mainly to higher plan liabilities pushed
up by the sustained decline in long-term interest rates in recent years. Under current rules,
these actuarial losses would feed into the balance sheets of pension sponsors for many
years to come.
Since the current position of most pension and other postretirement benefit plans is worse
than currently recognized on the balance sheet, Phase One of the FASB’s proposal would
significantly reduce reported shareholder’s equity (Table 1). The effect from FAS 87 is
notably larger than that from FAS 106. The aggregate decrease from the two types of
postretirement benefit plans is about 11 percent, while the median decrease across firms
is about 4 percent.

As shown in Figure 1, the proposal’s effects on shareholder’s equity would be highly
skewed. While the decline would be minimal for a majority of plan sponsors — and a
few would even report an increase — many firms would have to report markedly lower
shareholder’s equity.

The effects of the proposed accounting changes would fall disproportionately on certain
industries (Table 2). The durable manufacturing industry would realize the largest decrease
(including both FAS 87 and FAS 106), while decreases would be minimal for the finance
industry. Both industries have large concentrations of pension plans. However, manufacturing
firms shoulder more retiree health liabilities, while the finance industry’s pension
plans are almost fully funded and their balance sheets more accurately reflect their current
funding position.

The FASB initiative raises a fundamental question: Does the market already understand
pension accounting? The dramatic reduction in shareholder’s equity reported on some
company balance sheets might not drastically lower share prices or alter the credit terms
of sponsoring companies if the market has already priced in the current funded status of
pension and other postretirement benefit plans. These data are readily available in the
footnotes to financial statements, and both credit and equity analysts have developed
explicit methodologies for adjusting both the income statements and the balance sheets of
sponsoring firms to account for postretirement benefit plans.2 However, while these analysts
inform the market, investors actually set prices. So the extent to which investors
buying and selling securities have factored in postretirement obligations remains a more
open question.
While it seems plausible that investors in large industrial firms with prominent postretirement
obligations are well aware of the plans’ current positions, they may be less
aware of the complete financial picture for companies whose plans constitute a smaller
share of total company obligations and market value. A preliminary strategy for responding
to the potential accounting changes is to discuss with analysts and investors the likely
impact on reported shareholder’s equity.
1Currently, the PBO is FASB’s preferred measure of pension liabilities and so would be used in determining
funding status in the first stage. The second phase of the project would revisit whether the PBO, the accumulated
benefit obligation (ABO) or some other measure is the most appropriate measure of pension liability.
2For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between pension funding and credit ratings, see “Cashing
In: Do Aggressive Funding Policies Lead to Higher Credit Ratings?” Watson Wyatt Insider, October 2005.
December 2005
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